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This review examines recent advances in the study of brain correlates of consciousness. First, we
briefly discuss some useful distinctions between consciousness and other brain functions. We then
examine what has been learned by studying global changes in the level of consciousness, such as
sleep, anesthesia, and seizures. Next we consider some of the most common paradigms used to
study the neural correlates for specific conscious percepts and examine what recent findings say
about the role of different brain regions in giving rise to consciousness for that percept. Then we
discuss dynamic aspects of neural activity, such as sustained versus phasic activity, feedforward
versus reentrant activity, and the role of neural synchronization. Finally, we briefly consider how
a theoretical analysis of the fundamental properties of consciousness can usefully complement
neurobiological studies.
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Introduction
There are several strategies by which scientists can
approach the relationship between the brain and con-
sciousness. One is to wait and hope that, once we know
all there is to know about neuroanatomy and neuro-
physiology (or maybe when we can model in detail the
working of the entire brain; Markram 2006), the an-
swer will somehow pop out. Amore practical approach
is to use the tools of neuroscience that are available
now to shed light on the neural structures and activ-
ity patterns that underlie consciousness. For example,
one can examine how brain activity changes when,
everything else being as equal as possible, a stimulus
is experienced or not. In this way, one can attempt to
identify, more andmore precisely, the neural correlates
of consciousness (NCC), defined as the minimal neuronal
mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one specific conscious percept
(Koch 2003). A complementary strategy is to consider
conditions in which consciousness is globally dimin-
ished, such as deep sleep or anesthesia, and ask what
has changed in the brain. Finally, another approach is
to develop a theoretical framework that clarifies what
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consciousness is, how it can be generated by a physi-
cal system, and how it can be measured and then to
test the predictions of the theory against data from
neuroscience (Tononi 2004b).
This review focuses on recent advances in the study
of the NCC. First, we briefly discuss some useful dis-
tinctions between consciousness and other brain func-
tions. We then examine what has been learned about
theNCCby studying global changes in the level of con-
sciousness, such as sleep, anesthesia, and generalized
seizures. Next, we consider some of the most com-
mon paradigms used to study the NCC for specific
conscious percepts and examine what recent findings
say about the role of different brain regions in giving
rise to consciousness for that percept. Finally, we dis-
cuss the relation to the NCC of dynamic aspects of
neural activity, such as sustained versus phasic activity,
feedforward versus reentrant activity, and the role of
neural synchronization. We end with a few remarks on
the importance of a combined theoretical and neuro-
biological approach.
Consciousness and Other Brain
Functions
Many suggestions have been ventured in the hope of
alleviating the puzzle of subjective experience. Perhaps
consciousness emerges somehow when an organism is
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immersed in some complex sensorimotor loop that in-
cludes the environment. Another common idea is that
consciousness may somehow arise when one part of
the brain, acting as the “subject” (typically the front),
looks upon another part as its “object” (typically the
back), and evaluates or reflects upon its activity. It is of-
ten thought that in the end consciousness may reduce
to attention and its brain mechanisms, since we are
usually conscious of what we attend. Much could be
said about each of these suggestions. Here, we briefly
consider some recent results (and some very old evi-
dence) indicating that consciousness—in the sense of
having an experience—does not require sensorimotor
loops involving the body and the world, does not re-
quire self-reflection (or language), and does not reduce
to attention.
Consciousness and Sensory Input/Motor
Output
We are usually conscious of what goes on around
us, and occasionally of what goes on within our body.
So it is only natural to think that consciousness may
be tightly linked to the ongoing interaction we main-
tain with the world and the body. However, there are
many examples to the contrary. We are conscious of
our thoughts, which do not seem to correspond to any-
thing out there; we can also imagine things that are
not out there. When we do so, sensory areas can be
activated from the inside (Kosslyn et al. 2001), though
there are some differences (Amedi et al. 2005). Also,
stimulus-independent consciousness is associated with
its own patterns of activation within cortex and tha-
lamus (Mason et al. 2007). During dreams, we are
virtually disconnected from the environment (Hobson
et al. 2000)—hardly anything of what happens around
us enters consciousness, and our muscles are paralyzed
(except for eye muscles and diaphragm). Nevertheless,
we are vividly conscious: all that seems to matter is
that the thalamocortical system continues to function
more or less as in wakefulness, as shown by unit record-
ing, EEG, and neuroimaging studies performed dur-
ing rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, when dreams
are most intense (Maquet et al. 1996). Interestingly,
certain regions of the thalamocortical systems, such
as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, are deactivated in
REM sleep, which likely accounts for some peculiari-
ties of dreaming experiences, such as the reduction of
voluntary control.
Neurological evidence also indicates that neither
sensory inputs nor motor outputs are needed to gener-
ate consciousness. For instance, retinally blind people
can both imagine and dream visually if they become
blind after 6–7 years of age or so (Hollins 1985; Buchel
et al. 1998). Patients with the locked-in syndrome can
be almost completely paralyzed, and yet they are just
as conscious as healthy subjects (Laureys et al. 2005)
and can compose eloquent accounts of their condition
(Bauby 1997). A transient form of paralysis is one of the
characteristic features of narcolepsy. Severe cataleptic
attacks can last for minutes and leave the patient col-
lapsed on the floor, utterly unable to move or to sig-
nal, but fully aware of her surroundings (Guilleminault
1976; Siegel 2000). Or consider the Californian drug
addicts known as the frozen addictswho acquired some of
the symptoms of severe, late-stage Parkinson’s disease,
fully conscious, yet unable to move or speak (Langston
& Palfreman 1995). All six had previously taken syn-
thetic heroin tainted withMPTP, which selectively and
permanently destroyed dopamine-producing neurons
in their basal ganglia. Thus, consciousness here and
now seems to depend onwhat certain parts of the brain
are doing, without requiring any obligatory interaction
with the environment or the body.
Consciousness and Self-Reflection
Consciousness is usually evaluated by verbal reports,
and questions about consciousness (“Did you see any-
thing on the screen?”) are answered by “looking in-
side” retrospectively and reporting what one has just
experienced. So it is perhaps natural to suggest that
consciousness may arise through the ability to reflect
on our own perceptions: our brain would form a scene
of what it sees, but we would become conscious of it—
experience it subjectively—only when we, as a subject
of experience, watch that scene from the inside. This
suggestion is often framed in a neurobiological context
by assuming that patterns of activity corresponding
to “unconscious” or “subconscious” percepts form in
posterior regions of the cerebral cortex involved in the
categorization/association of sensory stimuli. These
percepts then become conscious when mainly ante-
rior prefrontal and cingulate regions involved in self-
representations interact with posterior cortex, perhaps
by reading in signals through forward connections and
selectively amplifying them through back connections
(more on this later).
There is of course no doubt that the brain catego-
rizes its own patterns of activity in the sense that neu-
rons respond mainly to the activity of other neurons,
so the brain is constantly “looking at itself.” However,
this is not necessarily in terms of a “subject” (the front)
looking at an “object” represented in sensory cortices
(the back). Leaving aside the mystery of why reflecting
on something should make it conscious, this scenario
is made less plausible by a common observation: when
we become absorbed in some intense perceptual task,
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for example watching an engrossing movie, playing a
fast-paced video game, or rushing through the woods
at high speed, we are vividly conscious—we are im-
mersed in the rapid flow of experience—without any
need for reflection or introspection. Often, we become
so immersed in such flow that we may lose the sense
of self, the inner voice. Perhaps the habit of thinking
about consciousness has distracted the scholars who
write upon such matters to devalue the unreflective
nature of much of experience.
A recent neuroimaging study by Malach and col-
laborators (Hasson et al. 2004) throws some inter-
esting light on these old observations. Subjects were
scanned with fMRI in three conditions. In the slow
categorization task, subjects were asked to catego-
rize pictures into animal/no-animal categories. Dur-
ing the introspective task, subjects viewed the images
and then introspected about their emotional response
(strong/neutral). Finally, the fast categorization task
was identical to the “slow” condition but at triple
the stimulation rate. Thus, “slow” and “introspection”
conditions were identical in terms of sensory stimuli
and motor output but differed in the cognitive task.
On the other hand, “slow” and “rapid” conditions
were similar in the cognitive task but differed in the
sensorimotor processing and attentional loads. Behav-
ioral measurements confirmed that self-awareness was
high during the introspection task, and virtually abol-
ished during rapid categorization. The neuroimaging
results were clear: during introspection there was an
activation of prefrontal regions, whereas sensory cor-
tex was strongly activated during rapid categorization.
Crucially, during introspection self-related cortex was
deactivated below the rest condition. This deactiva-
tion of prefrontal regions was thus the neural corre-
late of “losing oneself ” in the task. To the extent that
these prefrontal regions were indeed involved in self-
representation, these findings suggest that their activa-
tion is not necessary for the emergence of perceptual
consciousness, but only to reflect upon it and report it
to others. Indeed, it appears that self-related activity
is actually shut off during highly demanding sensory
tasks.
Lesion studies also seem to support the notion that
consciousness does not require prefrontal cortex and,
by inference, the functions it performs. Though pa-
tients with widespread, bilateral damage to prefrontal
cortex are rare, two recent clinical studies provide
some intriguing evidence. A man who, at the age
of 21, had fallen on an iron spike that completely
penetrated through both of his frontal lobes, never-
theless went on to live a stable life—marrying and
raising two children—in an appropriate professional
and social setting. Although displaying many of the
typical frontal lobe behavioral disturbances, he never
complained of loss of sensory perception, nor did he
show visual or other deficits (Mataro et al. 2001). An-
other case is that of a 27-year-old woman with mas-
sive bilateral prefrontal damage of unclear etiology
(Markowitsch & Kessler 2000). While manifesting
grossly deficient scores in frontal lobe sensitive tests,
she showed no abnormal perceptual abilities (that is
not to say that such patients do not suffer from subtle
visual deficits; Barcelo et al. 2000).
Consciousness and Attention
Consciousness and attention have resisted clear and
compelling definitions. Few would dispute that the re-
lationship between the two is an intimate one. When
subjects pay attention to an object, they become con-
scious of its various attributes; when the focus of at-
tention shifts away, the object fades from conscious-
ness. Indeed, more than a century of research efforts
have quantified the ample benefits accrued to attended
and consciously perceived events (Pashler 1998; Braun
et al. 2001). This has prompted many to posit that the
two processes are inextricably interwoven, if not iden-
tical (Posner 1994; Merikle & Joordens 1997; Chun &
Wolfe 2000; O’Regan & Noe 2000). Others, however,
going back to the 19th century, have argued that atten-
tion and consciousness are distinct phenomena, with
distinct functions and neuronal mechanisms (Iwasaki
1993; Hardcastle 1997; Lamme 2003; Baars 2005;
Block 2005; Dehaene et al. 2006; Koch & Tsuchiya
2007). Recent psychophysical and neurophysiological
evidence argues in favor of a dissociation between selec-
tive attention and consciousness, suggesting that events
or objects can be attended to without being consciously
perceived. Conversely, an event or object can be con-
sciously perceived in the near absence of top-down
attentional processing.
Attention without Consciousness
Consider that subjects can attend to a location for
many seconds and yet fail to see one or more attributes
of an object at that location. In lateral masking (visual
crowding), the orientation of a peripherally presented
grating is hidden from conscious sight but remains
sufficiently potent to induce an orientation-dependent
aftereffect (He et al. 1996) Montaser-Kouhsari and
Rajimehr (2004) showed that an aftereffect induced
by an invisible illusory contour required focal atten-
tion, even though the object at the center of attention
was invisible. Naccache and colleagues (2002) elicited
priming for invisible words (suppressed by a combi-
nation of forward and backward masking) but only if
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the subject was attending to the invisible prime-target
pair; without attention, the same word failed to elicit
priming. That is, the subject needs to attend to the
masked stimulus for priming to occur, but the actual
stimulus is not seen (with an associated d′ = 0). In
another experiment, male/female nudes attracted at-
tention and induced involuntary eye movements when
they were rendered completely invisible by continuous
flash suppression (Jiang et al. 2006).When subjects had
to discriminate the location of the masked nude from
the location of a masked shuffled nude, they were at
chance; without the intraocular masking, the images
are clearly visible. fMRI evidence confirms attentional
modulation of invisible images in primary visual cor-
tex (Bahrami et al. 2007). In conclusion, attentional
selection does not necessarily engender phenomenal
sensations, although it may often do so.
Consciousness in the Absence of Attention
When focusing intensely on one event, the world
is not reduced to a tunnel, with everything outside
the focus of attention gone: we are always aware of
some aspects of the world surrounding us, such as its
gist. Indeed, gist is immune from inattentional blind-
ness (Mack & Rock 1998)—when a photograph cover-
ing the entire background is briefly and unexpectedly
flashed onto the screen, subjects can accurately report
a summary of its content. In the 30ms necessary to ap-
prehend the gist of a scene, top-down attention cannot
play much of a role (because gist is a property asso-
ciated with the entire image, any process that locally
enhances features is going to be of limited use).
Or take the perception of a single object (say a bar) in
an otherwise empty display, a nonecological but com-
mon arrangement in many animal and human experi-
ments. Here, what function would top-down, selective
attention need to perform without any competing item
in or around fixation? Indeed, the most popular neu-
ronal model of attention, biased competition (Desimone
& Duncan 1995), predicts that in the absence of com-
petition, no or little attentional enhancement occurs,
yet we are perfectly aware of the object and its back-
ground.
In a dual-task paradigms, the subject’s attention is
drawn to a demanding central task, while at the same
time a secondary stimulus is flashed somewhere in the
periphery. Using the identical retinal layout, the sub-
ject either performs the central task, the peripheral
task, or both simultaneously (Sperling & Dosher 1986;
Braun & Sagi 1990; Braun & Julesz 1998). With fo-
cal attention busy at the center, the subject can still
distinguish a natural scene containing an animal (or
a vehicle) from one that does not include an animal
(or a vehicle), while being unable to distinguish a red-
green bisected disk from a green-red one (Li et al.
2002). Likewise, subjects can tell male from female
faces or even distinguish a famous from a nonfamous
face (Reddy et al. 2004; Reddy & Koch 2006) but are
frustrated by tasks that are computationally much sim-
pler (e.g., discriminating a rotated letter “L” from a
rotated “T”). This is quite remarkable. Thus, while we
cannot be sure that observers do not deploy some lim-
ited amount of top-down attention in these dual-task
experiments that require training and concentration
(i.e., high arousal), it remains true that subjects can
perform certain discriminations but not others in the
near absence of top-down attention. And they are not
guessing. They can be quite confident of their choices
and “see,” albeit often indistinctly, what they can
discriminate.
The existence of such dissociations—attention
without consciousness and consciousness without
attention—should not be surprising when considering
their different functions. Attention is a set of mecha-
nisms whereby the brain selects a subset of the incom-
ing sensory information for higher level processing,
while the nonattended portions of the input are ana-
lyzed at a lower band width. For example, in primates,
about one million fibers leave each eye and carry on
the order of one megabyte per second of raw infor-
mation. One way to deal with this deluge of data is to
select a small fraction and process this reduced input in
real time, while the nonattended data suffer from be-
nign neglect. Attention can be directed by bottom-up,
exogenous cues or by top-down endogenous features
and can be applied to a spatially restricted part of the
image (focal, spotlight of attention), an attribute (e.g.,
all red objects), or to an entire object. By contrast, con-
sciousness appears to be involved in providing a kind
of “executive summary” of the current situation that
is useful for decision making, planning, and learning
(Baars).
Changes in the Level of Consciousness
In neurology, a distinction is traditionally made be-
tween the level of consciousness and the content of
consciousness. When you fall asleep, for example, the
level of consciousness decreases to the point that you
become virtually unconscious—the degree to which
you are conscious (of anything) becomes progressively
less and less. The content of consciousness, instead,
refers to the particular experience you’re having at any
given time, for the same level of consciousness. It is use-
ful to maintain this distinction when considering the
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NCC, and begin by considering changes in the level of
consciousness.
Sleep
Sleep offers a commonplace, daily demonstration
that the level of consciousness can change dramati-
cally. In the laboratory, a subject is awakened during
different stages of sleep and asked to report “anything
that was going through your mind just before waking
up.” What is most noteworthy for the present pur-
poses is that a number of awakenings from non-REM
(NREM) sleep, especially early in the night when EEG
slow waves are prevalent, can yield no report what-
soever. Thus, early slow-wave sleep is the only phase
of adult life during which healthy human subjects may
deny that theywere experiencing anything at all.When
present, reports from NREM sleep early in the night
are often short and thought-like. However, especially
later in the night, reports from NREM sleep can be
longer, more hallucinatory and, generally speaking,
more dream-like. On the other hand, awakenings dur-
ingREM sleep almost always yield dreams—vivid con-
scious experiences, sometimes organized within a com-
plex narrative structure (Hobson et al. 2000; Hobson
& Pace-Schott 2002).
What are the processes underlying the fading of the
level of consciousness during early slow-wave sleep?
Though metabolic rates decrease in many cortical ar-
eas, especially frontal and parietal areas, the thalam-
ocortical system is far from shutting down. Instead,
triggered by a decrease in acetylcholine and other
modulators, cortical and thalamic neurons undergo
slow oscillations (1Hz or less) between an up and
a down state (Steriade et al. 2001). During the up
state, cortical cells remain depolarized at waking levels
for around a second and fire at waking rates, often
in the gamma range (Destexhe et al. 2007). How-
ever, the up state of NREM sleep is not stable as
in wakefulness and REM sleep, but it is inherently
bistable. The longer neurons remain depolarized, the
more likely they become to precipitate into a hyper-
polarized down state—a complete cessation of synap-
tic activity that can last for a tenth of a second or
more—after which they revert to another up state.
The transition from up to down states appears to be
due to depolarization-dependent potassium currents
and to short-term synaptic depression, both of which
increase with the amount of prior activation (Steri-
ade 2003). The slow oscillation is found in virtually
every cortical neuron and is synchronized across the
cortical mantle by cortico-cortical connections, which
is why the EEG records high-voltage, low-frequency
waves.
An intriguing possibility is that changes in the level
of consciousness during sleep may be related to the de-
gree of bistability of thalamocortical networks (Tononi
2004b; Massimini et al. 2007). In a recent study, tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used in con-
junction with high-density EEG to record cortical
evoked responses to direct stimulation in waking and
sleep (Massimini et al. 2005; Massimini et al. 2007).
During wakefulness, TMS induced a sustained re-
sponse made of rapidly changing patterns of activity
that persisted until 300ms and involved the sequen-
tial activation of specific brain areas, depending on
the precise site of stimulation. During early NREM
sleep, however, the brain response to TMS changed
markedly. When applied to lateral cortical regions,
the activity evoked by TMS remained localized to the
site of stimulation, without activating connected brain
regions, and lasted for less than 150ms (Massimini
et al. 2005). This finding indicates that during early
NREM sleep, when the level of consciousness is re-
duced, effective connectivity among cortical regions
breaks down, implying a corresponding breakdown of
cortical integration.Computer simulations suggest that
this breakdown of effective connectivity may be due to
the induction of a local down state (Esser & Tononi, in
preparation). When applied over centromedian pari-
etal regions, each TMS pulse triggered a stereotypical
response implying the induction of a global down state:
a full-fledged, high-amplitude slow wave (Massimini et
al. 2007) that closely resembled spontaneous ones and
that traveled through much of the cortex (Massimini
et al. 2004). Such stereotypical responses could be in-
duced even when, for the preceding seconds, there
were no slow waves in the spontaneous EEG, indicat-
ing that perturbations can reveal the potential bista-
bility of a system irrespective of its observed state. Al-
together, these TMS–EEGmeasurements suggest that
the sleeping brain, despite being active and reactive,
becomes inherently bistable: it either breaks down in
causally independent modules or bursts into a global,
stereotypical response. By contrast, during REM sleep
late in the night, when dreams become long and vivid
and consciousness returns to levels close to those of
wakefulness, the responses to TMS also recover and
come to resemble more closely those observed dur-
ing wakefulness: evoked patterns of activity become
more complex and spatially differentiated, although
some late components are still missing (Massimini &
Tononi, unpublished).
Anesthesia
The most common among exogenous manip-
ulations of the level of consciousness is general
244 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
anesthesia. Anesthetics come in twomain classes: intra-
venous agents used for induction, such as propofol and
ketamine, which are generally administered together
with sedatives such as midazolam and dexmedeto-
midine; and inhaled agents, such as isoflurane,
sevoflurane, and desflurane or the gases xenon and
nitrous oxide. The doses of inhaled anesthetics are
usually referred to their minimum alveolar concen-
tration (MAC): a MAC value of 1 is the dose that
prevents movement in 50% of subjects in response
to a painful surgical stimulation. At low MAC values
(0.1–0.2) anesthetics produce amnesia, first explicit and
then implicit. Frequently there are distortions of time
perception, such as slowing down and fragmentation,
and a feeling of disconnection from the environment.
Also, at low MAC values anesthetics produce increas-
ing sleepiness andmake arousal progressivelymore dif-
ficult, suggesting that to some extent they can mimic
neurophysiological events underlying sleep. At around
0.3MAC people experience a decrease in the level
of consciousness, also described as a “shrinking” in
the field of consciousness, as if they were kept on the
verge of falling asleep. MAC-awake, usually around
0.3–0.4MAC, is the point at which response to ver-
bal command is lost in 50% of patients and is con-
sidered the point at which consciousness is lost (LOC).
The transition to unconsciousness (LOC) appears to be
rather brusque, not unlike the collapse of muscle tone
that usually accompanies it, suggesting that neural pro-
cesses underlying consciousness change in a nonlinear
manner. At concentrations above LOC, movements
are still possible, especially partially coordinated re-
sponses to painful stimuli, suggesting that some degree
of “unconscious” processing is still possible. Complete
unresponsiveness is usually obtained just above MAC
of 1.0.
At the cellular level,many anesthetics havemixed ef-
fects, but the overall result is a decrease in neuronal ex-
citability by either increasing inhibition or decreasing
excitation. Most anesthetics act by enhancing GABA
inhibition or by hyperpolarizing cells through an in-
crease of potassium-leak currents. They can also inter-
fere with glutamatergic transmission and antagonize
acetylcholine at nicotinic receptors (Campagna et al.
2003; Franks 2006). But what are critical circuits me-
diating the LOC induced by anesthetics?
A considerable number of neuroimaging studies in
humans have recently shed some light on this issue
(Alkire & Miller 2005). The most consistent effects
produced by most anesthetics at LOC is a reduction
of thalamic metabolism and blood flow, suggesting the
possibility that the thalamus may serve as a conscious-
ness switch (Alkire et al. 2000). (Another common site
of action of several anesthetics is the posterior cingu-
late/medial parietal cortical areas, as well as the me-
dial basal forebrain). However, both PET and fMRI
signals mostly reflect synaptic activity rather than cel-
lular firing, and the thalamus receives a massive in-
nervation from cortex. Moreover, the relative reduc-
tion in thalamic activity occurs on a background of a
marked decrease in global metabolism (30–60%) that
involves many cortical regions. Thus, thalamic activity
as recorded by neuroimaging may represent an es-
pecially sensitive, localized readout of the extent of
widespread cortical deactivation, rather than the final
common pathway of unconsciousness (Ori et al. 1986).
In fact, spontaneous thalamic firing in animal models
of anesthesia is mostly driven by corticothalamic feed-
back (Vahle-Hinz et al. 2007), and themetabolic effects
of enflurane on the thalamus can be abolished by an
ipsilateral cortical ablation (Nakakimura et al. 1988),
suggesting that the switch in thalamic unit activity is
driven primarily through a reduction in afferent cor-
ticothalamic feedback more than by a direct effect of
anesthesia on thalamic neurons. Recently, thalamic ac-
tivity was recorded using depth electrodes in a patient
undergoing anesthesia for the implant of a deep brain
stimulator (Velly et al. 2007). With either propofol or
sevoflurane, when the patient lost consciousness, the
cortical EEG changed dramatically. However, there
was little change in the thalamic EEG until almost
10min later. This result implies that the deactivation
of cortex alone is sufficient for loss of consciousness,
and conversely that thalamic activity alone is insuffi-
cient to maintain it.
These findings do not imply that the thalamus is
irrelevant, but rather suggest that its effects on con-
sciousness are largely accounted for by its effects on
cortical circuits, most notably by providing a tonic fa-
cilitatory action that can help to restore consciousness,
or cause its collapse when it fails. A dramatic demon-
stration is provided by a recent study, where rats kept
under anesthetic concentration of sevoflurane could be
awakened by a minute injection of nicotinic agents in
an intralaminar thalamic nucleus (Alkire et al. 2007).
Conversely, GABA agonists infused into the same side
caused an immediate loss of consciousness (Miller et al.
1989; Miller & Ferrendelli 1990) (though nicotinic an-
tagonists did not).
Coma and Vegetative States
While consciousness may nearly fade during cer-
tain phases of sleep and be kept at very low lev-
els for a prescribed period during general anesthe-
sia, coma and vegetative states are characterized by
a loss of consciousness that is hard or impossible to
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reverse. Coma—an enduring sleep-like state of immo-
bility with eyes closed fromwhich the patient cannot be
aroused—represents the paradigmatic form of patho-
logical loss of consciousness. Typically, coma is caused
by a suppression of thalamocortical function by drugs,
toxins, or internal metabolic derangements. Other
causes of coma are head trauma, strokes, or hypoxia
due to heart failure, which again cause widespread de-
struction of thalamocortical circuits. Smaller lesions of
the reticular activating system can also cause uncon-
sciousness, presumably by deactivating the thalamo-
cortical system indirectly.
Patients who survive a coma may recover, while
others enter the so-called vegetative state, in which
eyes reopen, giving the appearance of wakefulness, but
unresponsiveness persists. Soon, regular sleep/waking
cycles follow. Respiration, other autonomic functions
and brainstem functions are relatively preserved, and
stereotypic, reflex-like responses can occur, including
yawning and grunting, but no purposeful behavior. Pa-
tients may remain vegetative for a long time or may
emerge to a “minimally conscious state.” This is dis-
tinguished from the vegetative state by the occasional
occurrence of some behaviors that do not appear to be
purely reflexive, suggesting that some degree of con-
sciousness may be present.
Post-mortem analysis in vegetative patients reveals
that the brainstem and hypothalamus, and specifi-
cally the reticular activating system, are largely spared,
which explains why patients look awake. Usually the
vegetative state is due to widespread lesions of gray
matter in neocortex and thalamus, to widespread
white-matter damage and diffuse axonal injury, or to
bilateral thalamic lesions, especially of the paramedian
thalamic nuclei. It is not clear whether thalamic dam-
age is largely a reflection of diffuse cortical damage
(as in metabolic studies of anesthesia, changes in the
thalamus are much more concentrated and therefore
easier to document than changes in cortex) or whether
even isolated thalamic damage can cause persistent
unconsciousness. Matrix, calbindin-positive thalamic
cells, which are most numerous within intralaminar
nuclei, project diffusely to supragranular layers of cor-
tex (Jones 1998) where they facilitate coherent high-
frequency oscillations (Joliot et al. 1994). Such cellsmay
be especially important in enabling effective interac-
tions among many cortical regions: if their activating
function is lost, patients may remain vegetative even
though cortical tissue may be relatively intact. Indeed,
Steven Laureys and colleagues showed that recovery
from a vegetative state was associated with the restora-
tion of functional connectivity between intralaminar
thalamic nuclei and prefrontal and anterior cingulate
cortices (Laureys et al. 2000a). A recent study by Niko
Schiff and colleagues shows the role of the thalamus
even more dramatically: bilateral deep brain electri-
cal stimulation of the central thalamus restored a de-
gree of behavioral responsiveness in a patient who had
remained in a minimally conscious state for 6 years
following brain trauma (Schiff et al. 2007).
In vegetative states, brain metabolism is globally re-
duced by 50 to 60%,most notably in regions such as the
posterior cingulate cortex and the precuneus (Laureys
et al. 2004; Schiff 2006a). These are also the areas that
reactivate most reliably if a patient regains conscious-
ness. A recent case study reported an extraordinary re-
covery of verbal communication andmotor function in
a patient who had remained in a minimally conscious
state for 19 years (Voss et al. 2006). Diffusion tensor
MRI showed increased fractional anisotropy (assumed
to reflect myelinated fiber density) in posteromedial
cortices, encompassing cuneus and precuneus. These
same areas showed increased glucose metabolism as
studied by PET scanning, likely reflecting the neu-
ronal regrowth paralleling the patient’s clinical recov-
ery. This and other neuroimaging studies of vegetative
orminimally conscious patients are demonstrating ever
more clearly that a purely clinical diagnosis of persis-
tent loss of consciousness may at times be dramatically
inaccurate. It was already known that patients with
locked-in syndromes due to pontine lesions that left
them almost completely paralyzed may seem unre-
sponsive, but if they preserve even a minimal ability
to signal (typically by moving an eye or eyelid up or
down) they can communicate a rich subjective expe-
rience. What about patients who show no voluntary
movement at all? Several imaging studies have now
shown that, even in completely unresponsive patients,
as long as significant portions of the thalamocortical
system are preserved, cognitive stimuli can induce pat-
terns of activation similar to those seen in healthy sub-
jects (Laureys et al. 2004; Schiff 2006b). As we have
seen in a previous section, stimuli that are not per-
ceived consciously can still activate appropriate brain
areas. Thus, inferring the presence of consciousness
may be unwarranted. However, in a recent, thought-
provoking study, a clinically vegetative, seemingly un-
responsive patient was put in the scanner and asked
to imagine playing tennis or navigating through her
room. Remarkably, the patient showed fMRI activa-
tion patterns of the appropriate cortical regions, exactly
like healthy subjects. Obviously, these activations could
not be due to unconscious processing of stimuli (Owen
et al. 2006). Of note, this patient had widespread
frontal lesions, while posterior cortex was largely
preserved.
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Seizures
The abnormal, hypersynchronous discharge of neu-
rons is a frequent cause of short-lasting impairments of
consciousness. Consciousness is lost or severely affected
in so-called generalized seizures, such as absence and
tonic-clonic seizures, and to a lesser extent in complex
partial seizures. Absence seizures, which are more fre-
quent in children, are momentary lapses of conscious-
ness during which a child stops what she was doing
and stares straight ahead blankly. Absence seizures are
accompanied by spike-and-wave complexes at around
3Hz in the EEG, reflecting cycles of synchronous fir-
ing and silence of large numbers of neurons. There
is great variability in the degree of unresponsiveness
both across subjects and, within the same subject, be-
tween seizures. Sometimes, simple behaviors such as
repetitive tapping or counting can proceed unimpaired
during the seizures, but more complex tasks come to a
halt.
Generalized convulsive seizures usually comprise a
tonic phase of muscle stiffening, followed by a clonic
phase with jerking of the arms and legs. After the con-
vulsion the person may be lethargic or in a state of
confusion for minutes up to hours. During the tonic
phase of a convulsive seizure neural activity is greatly
increased, as indicated by high frequency activity in
the EEG. The clonic phase is accompanied by syn-
chronous spikes and waves in the EEG, correspond-
ing to millions of neurons alternately firing in strong
bursts and turning silent. Loss of consciousness during
the tonic phase of generalized seizures is noteworthy
because it occurs at times when neuronal activity is
extremely high and synchronous.
Partial complex seizures often begin with strange
abdominal sensations, fears, premonitions, or auto-
matic gestures. The person progressively loses contact
with the environment, exhibits a fixed stare, and is
unable to respond adequately to questions or com-
mands. Stereotyped, automatic movements are com-
mon. Complex partial seizures usually last from 15 sec
to 3 min. Seizure activity is usually localized to the
medial temporal lobe.
The diagnosis of seizures is made through clini-
cal observation and EEG recordings. In absence and
tonic-clonic seizures the scalp EEG shows diffuse ab-
normalities, suggesting a generalized involvement of
brain networks, whereas in partial complex seizures
the abnormalities are confined to amedial temporal fo-
cus on one side. However, neuroimaging studies using
SPECT, PET, and fMRI, and depth EEG recordings
in humans and animals have revealed that general-
ized seizures do not affect all brain areas indiscrimi-
nately, whereas complex partial seizures alter brain ac-
tivity less focally than initially thought (Blumenfeld &
Taylor 2003; Blumenfeld et al. 2003; Blumenfeld et al.
2004; Blumenfeld 2005). In fact, it now appears that
all seizures causing an impairment of consciousness
are associated with changes in activity in three sets of
brain areas, namely: i) increased activity in the upper
brainstem and medial thalamus; ii) decreased activity
in the anterior and posterior cingulate, medial frontal
cortex, and precuneus; iii) altered activity in the lateral
and orbital frontal cortex and in the lateral parietal
cortex. In tonic-clonic seizures, fronto-parietal associ-
ation areas show increased activity, while the pattern is
more complex and variable in absence seizures, though
parietal areas are usually deactivated. Complex partial
seizures show decreased activity in frontal and parietal
association cortex, which is associated with the onset
of slow waves similar to those of sleep or anesthesia
(rather than to epileptiform discharges).
At this stage, it is not clear which of these three sets
of areas, alone or in combination, are crucial for the
loss of consciousness. However, two things are clear:
first, the areas involved in the loss of consciousness
associated with seizures correspond to those affected
in sleep, anesthesia, and the vegetative state, pointing
to a common substrate for the most common forms of
loss of consciousness; and second, especially during the
tonic phase of convulsive seizures, it would seem that
consciousness is lost when neurons are excessively and
synchronously active, rather than inactive.
Changes in the Content of
Consciousness—-Localizing the NCC
As we have seen, much can be learned by studying
how brain activity changes with changes in the overall
level of consciousness. A complementary approach is
to examine how brain activity changes when a specific
content of consciousness changes—for example, a vi-
sual stimulus becomes visible or invisible—while every-
thing else, including the overall level of consciousness
as well as the sensory input, remains as constant as pos-
sible. Recording spike trains from individual neurons
or measuring hemodynamic signals while the subject
is looking at a stimulus in an MR scanner allows re-
searchers to investigate what kind of neuronal activity
is correlated with the conscious perception of the stim-
ulus rather than with the mere presentation of the
stimulus. The goal is to follow the footprints of con-
sciousness in the brain by ultimately identifying the
neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)—the mini-
mal neuronal mechanisms that are jointly sufficient for
any one specific conscious percept (Crick&Koch 1995,
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1998, 2003). Thus, every phenomenal, subjective state
will have associated NCC: one for seeing a red patch,
another one for seeing grandmother, yet a third one
for hearing a siren, another one for feeling free to act
one way or another and so on. Perturbing or inactivat-
ing the NCC for any one specific conscious experience
will affect the percept or cause it to disappear. If the
NCC could be induced artificially, for instance by cor-
tical microstimulation in a prosthetic device or during
neurosurgery, the subject will experience the associated
percept. This definition of the NCC stresses the word
“minimal,” because the question of interest is which
subcomponents of the brain are actually needed. For
instance, while neural activity in the cerebellum may
ultimately affect some behaviors elicited by the presen-
tation of a stimulus (such as eye movements), it is likely
that such activity has little to do with the generation of
the conscious percept of that stimulus, and thus is not
part of the NCC.
Many questions can be asked: What characterizes
the NCC for a specific experience? What do the NCC
for different experiences have in common? Do the
NCC involve just the thalamocortical system, or do
they extend to structures such as the hippocampus,
the claustrum, or the basal ganglia? Do they involve all
pyramidal neurons in cortex at any given point in time?
Or only a subset of cells in frontal lobes that project to
the sensory cortices in the back? Only layer 5 cortical
cells? Neurons that fire in a phasic, synchronous, or
oscillatory manner? Or neurons that are included in
reentrant loops? These are some of the proposals that
have been advanced over the past years (Chalmers
2000).
Much of the contemporary work aimed at char-
acterizing the NCC has concentrated on changes in
specific visual contents of consciousness (or awareness,
which is here used interchangeably), in part because
visual experience is easy to manipulate experimentally,
and in part because more is known about the anatomy
and function of visual areas in primates than about
any other brain regions. Visual psychologists have per-
fected a number of techniques—masking, binocular
rivalry, continuous flash suppression, motion-induced
blindness, change blindness, inattentional blindness—
in which the seemingly simple and unambiguous rela-
tionship between a physical stimulus in the world, the
resulting neural activity, and its associated percept is
disrupted (Kim & Blake 2005). We first consider what
such approaches have revealed about the brain areas
that underlie the NCC, focusing specifically on the vi-
sual system. In the following sections we ask whether
the NCC for visual percepts corresponds to some spe-
cial kind of neural activity.
A Test Case: The NCC in Visual Cortex
Many experiments exploit perceptual illusions in
which the physical stimulus remains fixedwhile the per-
cept fluctuates. The best known example is the Necker
cube, whose 12 lines can be perceived in one of two
different ways in depth. Another perceptual illusion
that is easy to vary parametrically is binocular rivalry
(Blake & Logothetis 2002): a small image, for example
a horizontal grating, is presented to the left eye and an-
other image, for example a vertical grating, is shown
to the corresponding location in the right eye. In spite
of the constant visual stimulus, observers consciously
see the horizontal grating alternate every few seconds
with the vertical one. The brain does not allow for the
simultaneous perception of both images.
Macaque monkeys can be trained to report whether
they see the left or the right image. The distribution of
the switching times and the way in which changing the
contrast in one eye affects the reports leaves little doubt
that monkeys and humans experience the same basic
phenomenon. In a series of elegant experiments, Lo-
gothetis and colleagues (Leopold & Logothetis 1996;
Logothetis 1998) recorded from a variety of visual cor-
tical areas in the awake macaque monkey while the
animal performed a binocular rivalry task. In primary
visual cortex (V1), only a small fraction of cells weakly
modulated their response as a function of the percept of
the monkey. The majority of cells responded to one or
the other retinal stimulus with little regard to what the
animal perceived at the time. In contrast, in a high-
level cortical area such as the inferior temporal (IT)
cortex along the ventral pathway, almost all neurons
responded only to the perceptual dominant stimulus,
that is, to the stimulus that was being reported. For
example, when a face and a more abstract design were
presented, one of these to each eye, a “face” cell fired
only when the animal indicated by its performance
that it saw the face and not the design presented to
the other eye. This result implies that the NCC involve
activity in neurons in inferior temporal cortex (but not,
of course, that the NCC are local to IT).
In a related perceptual phenomenon, flash suppres-
sion (Wolfe 1984), the percept associated with an image
projected into one eye is suppressed by flashing another
image into the other eye (while the original image re-
mains). A methodological advantage over binocular
rivalry is that the timing of the perceptual transition
is determined by an external trigger rather than by
an internal event. The majority of responsive cells in
inferior temporal cortex and in the superior temporal
sulcus follow the monkey’s behavior—and therefore its
percept. That is, when the animal perceives a cell’s
preferred stimulus, the neuron fires; when the stimulus
248 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
is present on the retina but is perceptually suppressed,
the cell falls silent, even though legions of V1 neu-
rons fire vigorously to the same stimulus (Sheinberg
& Logothetis 1997). Single neuron recordings in the
medial temporal lobe of epileptic patients during flash
suppression likewise demonstrate abolition of their re-
sponses when their preferred stimulus is present on the
retina but not seen (Kreiman et al. 2002).
In a powerful combination of binocular rivalry and
flash suppression, a stationary image in one eye can be
suppressed for minutes on end by continuously flash-
ing different images into the other eye (continuous flash
suppression; Tsuchiya & Koch 2005). This paradigm
lends itself naturally to further investigation of the rela-
tionship between neural activity—whether assayed at
the single neuron or at the brain voxel level—and con-
scious perception. Imaging experiments with such per-
ceptual illusions demonstrate quite conclusively that
BOLD activity in the upper stages of the ventral path-
way (e.g., the fusiform face area and the parahippocam-
pal place area) follow the percept and not simply the
retinal stimulus (Tong et al. 1998; Rees & Frith 2007).
There is a lively debate about the extent to which
neurons in primary visual cortex simply encode the
visual stimulus or are directly contributing to the sub-
ject’s conscious percept (Tong 2003). That is, is V1
part of the NCC (Crick & Koch 1995)? It is clear that
retinal neurons are not part of the NCC for visual ex-
periences. While retinal neurons often correlate with
visual experience, the spiking activity of retinal gan-
glion cells does not accord with visual experience (e.g.,
there are no photoreceptors at the blind spot; yet no
hole in the field of view is apparent, in dreams vivid im-
agery occurs despite closed eyes, and so on). A number
of compelling observations link perception with fMRI
BOLD activity in human V1 and even in the lateral
geniculate nucleus (LGN) (Tong et al. 1998; Lee et
al. 2005). These data are at odds with single-neuron
recordings from the monkey. This discrepancy is prob-
ably explained by the often tight relationship between
consciousness and attention that was mentioned above
(see section “Consciousness and Attention”). Unless at-
tentional effects are carefully controlled for, their neu-
ral correlates cannot be untangled from those of con-
sciousness (Huk et al. 2001; Tse et al. 2005). This has
now been achieved in an elegant study of Lee, Blake,
and Heeger (2007). Using a dual-task paradigm they
found that hemodynamic BOLD activity in humanV1
reflects attentional processes but does not directly cor-
relate with the conscious percept of the subject. The
experiment by Bahrami and colleagues (Bahrami et
al. 2007) comes to a similar conclusion—they show
that the fMRI signal in V1 associated with percep-
tually invisible line drawings can still be modulated
by selective visual attention. Also, Haynes and Rees
(2005) exploited multivariate decoding techniques to
read out perceptually suppressed information (the ori-
entation of a masked stimulus) from V1 BOLD ac-
tivity, even though the stimulus orientation was so effi-
cientlymasked that subjects performed at chance levels
when trying to guess the orientation. That is, although
subjects did not give any behavioral indication that
they saw the orientation of the stimulus, its slant could
be predicted on a single-trial basis with better-than-
chance odds from the V1 (but not from V2 or V3)
BOLD signal.
In conclusion, information pertaining to visual stim-
ulus can be registered in primary visual cortex thatmay
or may not be accessible to the subject. It may be mod-
ulated by attention, but it does not appear to correlate
directly with the subject’s percept. In that sense much
of the neural activity in V1 probably does not belong
to the NCC. Moreover, as suggested by PET exper-
iments in patients in a persistent vegetative state, in
whom stimuli evoked strong but localized activity in
primary auditory and primary somatosensory cortices
(Laureys et al. 2000b; Laureys et al. 2002), it may well
be that none of the primary sensory cortices contributes
directly to sensory consciousness.
Consciousness and Neural Dynamics
The studies discussed above indicate that, even
within the cerebral cortex, changes in neural activity do
not necessarily correlate with changes in conscious ex-
perience. Also, we saw earlier that most of the cortex is
active during early NREM sleep and anesthesia, not to
mention during generalized seizures, but subjects have
little conscious content to report. Thus, it is natural to
suggest that some additional dynamic feature of neural
activity must be present to generate conscious content.
Here we consider the roles of i) sustained versus phasic
activity, ii) reentrant versus feedforward activity, and
iii) synchronous or oscillatory activity.
Sustained versus Phasic Activity
A plausible idea is that neural activity may con-
tribute to consciousness only if it is sustained for a
minimum period of time, perhaps around a few hun-
dred ms. At the phenomenological level, there is no
doubt that the “now” of experience unfolds at a time
scale comprised between tens and several hundred ms
(Bachmann2000) and in some aspectsmay even stretch
to one or two seconds (Poppel & Artin 1988). Other
experiments have made use of the attentional blink
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phenomenon: when an observer detects a target in a
rapid stream of visual stimuli, there is a brief period of
time during which the detection of subsequent targets
is impaired. Remarkably, targets that directly follow the
first target are less impaired than those that follow after
200 to 400ms (Raymond et al. 1992). By manipulat-
ing attention, identical visual stimuli can be made con-
scious or unconscious. In such studies, event-related
potentials reflecting early sensory processing (the P1
and N1 components) were identical for seen and un-
seen stimuli but quickly diverged around 270ms, sug-
gesting that stimuli only become visible when a sus-
tained wave of activation spreads through a distributed
network of cortical association areas (Vogel et al. 1998;
Sergent et al. 2005).
More generally, the requirement for sustained dis-
charge might account for why fast, reflex responses
of the kind mediated by, say, the spinal cord, do not
seem to contribute to consciousness. Fast, reflex-like
responses also take place in the cerebral cortex. For ex-
ample, the action-oriented dorsal visual stream rapidly
adjusts movements that remain outside of conscious-
ness (Goodale & Milner 2005). Perhaps these reflex-
like adjustments to fast-changing aspects of the envi-
ronment that must be tracked online are incompatible
with the development of sustained discharge patterns.
By contrast, such sustained patterns may be necessary
for the ventral stream to build a stable representation
of a visual scene. By the same token, if the ventral
stream could be forced to behave in a reflex-like man-
ner, it should cease to be part of the NCC. Indeed,
this can be achieved by pushing the ventral system to
perform ultra-rapid categorizations such as deciding
whether a natural image contains an animal or not
(Thorpe et al. 1996; Bacon-Mace et al. 2005; Kirch-
ner & Thorpe 2006). In such cases, a sweep of activity
travels from the retina through several stages of feedfor-
ward connections along the hierarchy of ventral visual
areas, until it elicits an appropriate categorization re-
sponse. This process takes as little as 150ms, which
leaves only about 10ms of processing per stage. Thus,
only a few spikes can be fired before the next stage
produces its output, yet they are sufficient to spec-
ify selective responses for orientation, motion, depth,
color, shape, and even animals, faces, or places con-
veying most of the relevant information about the
stimulus (Hung et al. 2005). While this fast feedfor-
ward sweep within the ventral system is sufficient for
the near-automatic categorization of stimuli and a be-
havioral response, it seems insufficient to generate a
conscious percept (VanRullen & Koch 2003). For ex-
ample, if another image (the mask) is flashed soon after
the target image, subjects are still able to categorize
the target, though they may deny having seen it con-
sciously. Thus, consciousness would seem to require
that neural activity in appropriate brain structures lasts
for a minimum amount of time, perhaps as much as
is needed to guarantee interactions among multiple
areas.
On the other hand, other data would seem to sug-
gest that it may actually be the phasic, onset, or off-
set discharge of neurons that correlates with experi-
ence. The most stringent data come again from studies
of visual masking (for a review see Macknik 2006).
To be effective, masking stimuli must either precede
(forward masking) or follow (backward masking) tar-
get stimuli at appropriate time intervals and usually
need to be spatially contiguous. Macknik, Martinez-
Conde, and collaborators showed, using a combina-
tion of psychophysics, unit recordings in animals, and
neuroimaging in humans, that for simple, unattended
target stimuli, masking stimuli suppress visibility if their
“spatiotemporal edges” overlap with the spatiotempo-
ral edges of the targets, that is, if they begin or end
when target stimuli begin or end, in space and time.
They confirmed that such spatiotemporal edges cor-
respond to transient bursts of spikes in primary visual
cortex. If these bursts are inhibited, for example if the
offset discharge elicited by the target stimulus is oblit-
erated by the onset of the mask, the target becomes
invisible. Most likely, these spatiotemporal edges of in-
creased firing are both generated (target stimuli) and
suppressed (masking stimuli) by mechanisms of lateral
inhibition, which are ubiquitous in sensory systems
(Macknik 2006).
Additional evidence for the importance of phasic,
transient activation of neurons in determining the visi-
bility of stimuli comes from studies of microsaccades—
the small, involuntary movements that our eyes make
continually (Martinez-Conde et al. 2004). If microsac-
cades are counteracted by image stabilization on the
retina, stationary objects fade and become completely
invisible. In a recent study (Martinez-Conde et al.
2006), subjects were asked to fixate a central dot (which
tends to reduce microsaccades) while attending to a
surrounding circle. Soon, the circle fades and merges
into the background (the Troxler illusion). It was found
that before a fading period, the probability, rate, and
magnitude of microsaccades decreased. Before transi-
tions toward visibility, the probability, rate, and mag-
nitude of microsaccades increased, compatible with
the hypothesis that microsaccades are indeed neces-
sary for visibility. Importantly, in macaque monkeys,
when an optimally oriented line was centered over
the receptive field of cells in V1, the cells’ activity in-
creased after microsaccades and tended to emit bursts
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(Martinez-Conde et al. 2002), suggesting again that
phasic activity may be crucial for visibility.
One should remember, however, that the impor-
tance of phasic discharges for stimulus awareness has
only been demonstrated for early visual cortex; but,
as we saw above, the NCC are more likely to lie
elsewhere. Psychophysically, masking is similarly effec-
tive when masking stimuli are presented monoptically
(through the same eye as the target) and dichoptically
(through the other eye). The analysis of fMRI data
in humans shows that a correlate of monoptic visual
masking can be found in all retinotopic visual areas,
whereas dichoptic masking is only seen in retinotopic
areas downstream of V2 within the occipital lobe (Tse
et al. 2005), suggesting an anatomical lower bound for
the NCC. Thus, it could be that phasic onset and off-
set discharges are important not in and of themselves,
but because they are particularly effective in activating
downstream areas that directly support the NCC. In
these downstream areas, perhaps, the NCC may ac-
tually require sustained firing. Indeed, the duration of
the activation of face-selective neurons in IT is strongly
correlated with the visibility of masked faces (Rolls et
al. 1999).
Reentrant versus Feedforward Activity
Another possibility is that it is not so much sustained
firing that triggers the awareness of a stimulus, but
rather the occurrence of a “reentrant” wave of activity
(also described as recurrent, recursive, or reverberant)
from higher to lower cortical areas. In this view, when a
stimulus evokes a feedforward sweep of activity, it is not
seen consciously, but it becomes so when the feedfor-
ward sweep is joined by a reentrant sweep (Lamme &
Roelfsema 2000). This logic could apply both to early
sensory areas such as V1 and to higher areas such as IT.
For example, when face neurons in the fusiform face
area are first activated, we would not see a face con-
sciously, although we could turn our eyes toward it or
press a button to indicate our unconscious categoriza-
tion as a face. However, when face-selective neurons
receive a backward volley from some higher area, for
example frontal cortex, the face would become visible.
This view is based on several considerations. An im-
portant one, though rarely confessed, is that a mere
sequence of feedforward processing steps seems far
too “straightforward” and mechanical to offer a sub-
strate for subjective experience. Reentrant processes,
by “closing the loop” between past and present activ-
ity, or between predicted and actual versions of the
input, would seem to provide a more fertile substrate
for giving rise to reverberations (Lorente de No´ 1938),
generating emergent properties through cell assemblies
(Hebb 1949), implementing hypothesis testing through
resonances (Grossberg 1999), linking present with past
(Edelman & Mountcastle 1978; Edelman 1989), and
subject with object (Damasio 1999).
A more concrete reason why reentrant activity is
an attractive candidate for the NCC is that it travels
through back connections, of which the cerebral cortex
is extraordinarily rich (Felleman & Van Essen 1991).
In primates, feedforward connections originate mainly
in supragranular layers and terminate in layer 4. Feed-
back connections instead originate in both superficial
and deep layers and usually terminate outside of layer
4. The sheer abundance of back connections in sensory
regions suggests that they ought to serve some impor-
tant purpose, and giving rise to a conscious percept
might just fit the bill. However, back connections and
associated reentrant volleys are just as numerous be-
tween V1 and visual thalamus, which is usually denied
any direct contribution to awareness. Also, there does
not seem to be any lack of back connections within
the dorsal stream. It should be emphasized that the
strength and termination pattern of back connections
seem more suited to a modulatory/synchronizing role
than to driving their target neurons. For example, the
focal inactivation of area 18 can slightly increase or
decrease discharge rates of units in area 17, but it
does not change their feature selectivity for location
and orientation (Martinez-Conde et al. 1999). Also,
the numerosity of backward connections is a natural
consequence of the hierarchical organization of feed-
forward ones. For instance, cells in the LGN are not
oriented, while cells in area 17 are. To be unbiased,
feedback to any one LGN cell should come from area
17 cells of all orientations, which requires many con-
nections; on the other hand, since at any given time
only area 17 cells corresponding to a given orientation
would be active, feedback effects would not be strong.
If they were, properties of area 17 cells, such as orienta-
tion selectivity, would be transferred upon LGN cells,
which they are not (to a first approximation). Back-
ward signals certainly play a role in sensory function:
for instance, they can mediate some extraclassical re-
ceptive field effects, provide a natural substrate for both
attentional modulation and imagery, and can perhaps
dynamically route feedforward processing according
to prior expectations. But are backward signals really
critical for consciousness?
The most intriguing data in support of a role for
reentrant activity in conscious perception have come
from neurophysiological experiments. In awake mon-
keys trained to signal whether or not they see a salient
figure on abackground, the early, feedforward response
of V1 neurons was the same, no matter whether or not
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the monkey saw the figure (Super et al. 2001). How-
ever, a later response component was suppressed when
themonkey did not see the figure. Light anesthesia also
eliminated this later component without affecting the
initial response. Late components are thought to reflect
reentrant volleys from higher areas, although other
studies have disputed this claim (Rossi et al. 2001).
The late response component crucial for the visibil-
ity of stimuli under backward masking might also be
due to a reentrant volley (Lamme & Roelfsema 2000).
In this case the timing of maximal backward mask-
ing should be independent of target duration, since it
would be determined exclusively by the time needed
for the early component to travel to higher areas and
return to primary visual cortex. Instead, the timing of
maximal masking depends on the timing of target off-
set, suggesting that the component that is obliterated
is a feedforward offset discharge, not a reentrant one
(Macknik 2006). Moreover, the late component can be
dissociated from a behavioral response simply by rais-
ing the decision criterion (Super et al. 2001), and it
can occur in the absence of report during change and
inattentional blindness (Scholte et al. 2006). Perhaps in
such cases subjective experience is present but, due to
an insufficient involvement of frontal areas, it cannot be
reported (Block 2005; Tsuchiya & Koch 2005; Lamme
2006). But then, by the same token, why should we
rule out subjective experience during the feedforward
sweep?
Another main source of evidence for a role of reen-
trant volleys in consciousness comes from experiments
using TMS. In an early experiment, Pascual-Leone
and Walsh applied TMS to V5 to elicit large, mov-
ing phosphenes (Pascual-Leone & Walsh 2001). They
then applied another, subthreshold TMS pulse to a
corresponding location in V1. When TMS to V1 was
delivered after TMS to V5 (+5 to +45ms), subjects
often did not see the V5 phosphene, and when they
saw one, it was not moving. Their interpretation was
that disruption of activity in V1 at the time of arrival
of a reentrant volley from V5 interferes with the ex-
perience of attributes encoded by V5. In a subsequent
study (Silvanto et al. 2005), it was shown that, when a
subthreshold pulse was applied over V5, followed 10
− 40ms later by a suprathreshold pulse over V1, sub-
jects reported a V5-like phosphene (large andmoving),
rather than a V1 phosphene (small and stationary).
Their interpretation was that activity in V5 that, on
its own, is insufficient to induce a moving percept can
produce such a percept if the level of induced activity
in V1 is high enough.
In another study (Boyer et al. 2005), subjects where
shown either an oriented bar or a colored patch—
stimuli that are processed in visual cortex. If, around
100ms later, a TMS pulse was applied to V1, the stim-
ulus became perceptually invisible, although on forced
choice subjects could still discriminate orientation or
color. This result indicates that, without any overt par-
ticipation of V1, stimuli can reach extrastriate areas
without eliciting a conscious percept, just as in blind-
sight patients. It also suggests that, since the forward
sweep reaches V1 after just 30 or 40ms, the TMS pulse
may abolish the awareness of the stimulus not so much
by blocking feedforward transmission as by interfer-
ing with the backward volley (see also Ro et al. 2003).
On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that the
TMS pulse may act instead by triggering a cortical–
thalamo–cortical volley that interferes with the offset
discharge triggered by the stimulus, as may indeed be
the case in backward masking.
Yet another study, this time using fMRI, examined
the neural correlates of brightness (perceptual light-
ness) using backward masking. The psychometric vis-
ibility function was not correlated with the stimulated
portion of V1, but with downstream visual regions, in-
cluding fusiform cortex, parietal–functional areas, and
with the sectors of V1 responding to the unstimulated
surround (Haynes et al. 2005). Remarkably, visibility
was also correlated with the amount of coupling (ef-
fective connectivity) between fusiform cortex and the
portion of V1 that responded to the surround. Once
again, this result could be explained by the activation
of reentrant connections, though fMRI cannot distin-
guish between forward and backward influences.
Synchronization and Oscillations
Another influential idea is that consciousness may
require the synchronization, at a fine temporal scale,
of large populations of neurons distributed over many
cortical areas, in particular via rhythmic discharges
in the gamma range (30–70Hz and beyond) (Crick
& Koch 1990). The emphasis on synchrony ties in
well with the common assumption that consciousness
requires the “binding” together of a multitude of at-
tributes within a single experience, as when we see
a rich visual scene containing multiple objects and
attributes that is nevertheless perceived as a unified
whole (Singer 1999). According to this view, the NCC
of such an experience would include two aspects: first,
the underlying activation pattern (groups of neurons
that have increased their firing rates) would be widely
distributed across different areas of the cerebral cor-
tex, each specialized in signaling a different object
or attribute within the scene; and second, the firing
of these activated neurons would be synchronized on
a fast time scale to signal their binding into a single
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percept. In this respect, synchrony seems ideally suited
to signal relatedness: for example, in the presence of a
red square, some neurons would respond to the pres-
ence of a square, while others would respond to the
presence of the color red. If they synchronize at a fast
time scale, they would indicate to other groups of neu-
rons that there is a red square, “binding” the two fea-
tures together (Tononi et al. 1992). By contrast, signal-
ing relatedness by increased firing rates alone would be
more cumbersome and probably slower (Singer 1999).
Also, fine-temporal-scale synchrony has the welcome
property of disambiguating among multiple objects—
if a green cross were present simultaneously with the
red square, cross and green neurons would also be ac-
tive, but false conjunctions would be avoided by precise
phase locking (Tononi et al. 1992). Moreover, compu-
tational models predict that, for the same level of firing,
synchronous input is more effective on target neurons
than asynchronous input (Abeles 1991; Tononi et al.
1992), and indeed synchrony makes a difference to the
outputs to the rest of the brain (Brecht et al. 1999;
Schoffelen et al. 2005). Finally, large-scale models pre-
dict that synchrony in the gamma range occurs due to
the reciprocal connectivity and loops within the thala-
mocortical system (Lumer et al. 1997a, b), and indeed
phase alignment between distant groups of neurons in
the gamma range anticipates by a few ms an increase
in gamma-band power (Womelsdorf et al. 2007). In
this respect, oscillatory activity, even when subthresh-
old, could further facilitate synchronous interactions
by biasing neurons to discharge within the same time
frame (Engel et al. 2001).
Experimental evidence concerning the role of syn-
chrony/synchronous oscillations in perceptual oper-
ations was initially obtained in primary visual areas
of anesthetized animals (for a review see Singer &
Gray 1995). For example, in primary visual cortex,
neurons have been found that respond to a coher-
ent object by synchronizing their firing in the gamma
range. Stimulus-specific, gamma-range synchroniza-
tion is greatly facilitated when the EEG is activated
by stimulating the mesencephalic reticular formation
(Munk et al. 1996; Herculano-Houzel et al. 1999). It is
similarly facilitated by attention (Roelfsema et al. 1997)
and by increases in a dominant stimulus under binoc-
ular rivalry even though firing rates may not change
(Fries et al. 1997, 2001).
Other evidence has come fromEEG studies of phase
locking in humans. A recent study compared the neu-
ral correlates of words that were consciously perceived
with those of masked words that had been processed
and semantically decoded but had remained uncon-
scious (Melloni et al. 2007). The results showed that
consciously perceived words induced theta oscillations
in multiple cortical regions until the test stimulus was
presented and a decision reached, while a burst of
gamma activity occurred over central and frontal leads
just prior to and during the presentation of the test
stimulus. Importantly, the earliest event distinguishing
conscious and unconscious processing was not visi-
ble in the power changes of oscillations but in their
phase locking. About 180ms after presentation of stim-
uli that were consciously perceived, induced gamma
oscillations recorded from a large number of regions
exhibited precise phase locking both within and across
hemispheres for around 100ms. These results have
been interpreted to indicate that a transient event of
gamma synchrony resets multiple parallel processes to
a common time frame. The global theta rhythm that
follows after this trigger event could provide the time
frame for allowing a global integration of information
provided by sensory inputs and internal sources. Or
perhaps beta–gamma synchrony could enable the in-
tegration of activity patterns within local cortical areas,
while theta synchrony would permit the integration of
more globally distributed patterns: the more global the
representation, the longer the time scale for the inte-
gration of distributed information.
It would be premature to conclude, however, that
synchrony in one or another frequency band is neces-
sarily a marker of NCC. As revealed by an increasing
number of EEG,MEG, electrocorticography, andmul-
tiunit recordings, cognitive tasks are associated with
complex modes of synchronous coupling among pop-
ulations of neurons that shift rapidly both within and
across different frequency bands, within and between
areas, and in relation to the timing of the task (Wom-
elsdorf et al. 2007). It would rather seem that, given
the brain’s remarkable connectivity, synchrony is an in-
evitable accompaniment of neural activity, and that it
is bound to change just as activity patterns change,
depending on the precise experimental conditions.
Whether a particular kind of synchrony, for example
in the gamma range, is uniquely associated with con-
sciousness is still unclear. For example, high beta and
gamma synchrony can be found in virtually every brain
region investigated, including some that are unlikely to
contribute directly to consciousness. Also, it is not yet
clear whether synchrony in the gamma range vanishes
during early NREM sleep, during anesthesia, or even
during seizures. Human studies are still inconsistent
on this point, whereas animal studies show a paradox-
ical increase in gamma synchrony when rats lose the
righting reflex (thought to correspond more or less to
the loss of consciousness in humans; see Imas et al.
2005a, b). It would seem that there can be synchrony
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without consciousness, though perhaps not conscious-
ness without synchrony, at least in mammalian brains.
Finally, there are some difficult conceptual prob-
lems in characterizing synchrony as an essential ingre-
dient that unifies perceptual states and thereby makes
them conscious. While many experiences do indeed
involve several different elements and attributes that
are “bound” together into a unified percept, there are
many other experiences, equally conscious, that do not
seem to require much binding at all: for instance, an
experience of pure darkness or of pure blue, or a loud
sound that briefly occupies consciousness and has no
obvious internal structure, would merely seem to re-
quire the strong activation of the relevant neurons, with
no need for signaling relatedness to other elements,
and thus no need for synchrony. Also, the idea that
the NCC of a given conscious experience are given by
active neurons bound by synchrony discounts the im-
portance of inactive ones: information specifying that
particular unified experience must be conveyed both
by which neurons are active and which are not, yet for
inactive neurons there does not seem to be anything
to bind. On the other hand, if most neurons in the
cortex were to become active hypersynchronously, as
is the case in generalized seizures, they should result in
maximal “binding,” but consciousness vanishes rather
than become more vivid..
Consciousness from a Theoretical
Perspective
Progress in the study of the NCC will hopefully
lead to a better understanding of what distinguishes
neural structures or processes that are associated with
consciousness from those that are not. But even if we
come closer to this goal, we still need to understand
why certain structures and processes have a privileged
relationship with subjective experience. For example,
why is it that neurons in thalamocortical circuits are
essential for conscious experience, whereas cerebellar
neurons, despite their huge numbers, are not? And
what is wrong with many cortical circuits, including
those inV1, thatmakes themunsuitable to yield subjec-
tive experience? Or why is it that consciousness wanes
during slow-wave sleep early in the night, despite lev-
els of neural firing in the thalamocortical system that
are comparable to those in quiet wakefulness? Other
questions are even more difficult to address in the ab-
sence of a theory. For example, is consciousness present
in animals that have a nervous system considerably
different from ours? And what about computerized
robots or other artifacts that behave intelligently but
are organized in a radically different way from human
brains?
Consciousness as Integrated Information
To address these questions, it would seem that we
need a theoretical approach that tries to establish, at the
fundamental level, what consciousness is, how it can be
measured, and what requisites a physical system must
satisfy in order to generate it. The integrated information
theory of consciousness represents such an approach
(Tononi 2004b).
According to the theory, the most important prop-
erty of consciousness is that is extraordinarily informa-
tive. This is because, whenever you experience a par-
ticular conscious state, it rules out a huge number of
alternative experiences. Classically, the reduction of
uncertainty among a number of alternatives consti-
tutes information. For example, you lie in bed with
eyes open and experience pure darkness and silence.
This is one of the simplest experiences you might have,
one that may not be thought as conveying much in-
formation. One should realize, however, that the in-
formativeness of what you just experienced lies not in
how complicated it is to describe, but in how many
alternatives were ruled out when you experienced it:
you could have experienced any one frame from any of
innumerable movies, or the smoke and flames of your
room burning, or any other possible scene, but you did
not—instead, you experienced darkness and silence.
This means that when you experienced darkness and
silence, whether you think or not of what was ruled out
(and you typically don’t), you actually gained access to
a large amount of information. This point is so simple
that its importance has been overlooked.
It is essential to realize, however, that the informa-
tion associated with the occurrence of a conscious state
is integrated information. When you experience a par-
ticular conscious state, that conscious state is an inte-
grated whole—it cannot be subdivided into compo-
nents that are experienced independently. For exam-
ple, the conscious experience of the particular phrase
you are reading now cannot be experienced as subdi-
vided into, say, the conscious experience of how the
words look independently of the conscious experience
of how they sound in your mind. Similarly, you cannot
experience visual shapes independently of their color,
or perceive the left half of the visual field of view inde-
pendently of the right half.
Based on these and other considerations, the theory
claims that the level of consciousness of a physical system is
related to the repertoire of causal states (information) available to
the system as a whole (integration). That is, whenever a sys-
tem enters a particular state though causal interactions
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among its elements, it is conscious in proportion to how
many system states it has thereby ruled out, provided
these are states of the system as a whole, not decom-
posable into states of causally independent parts. More
precisely, the theory introduces ameasure of integrated
information called, quantifying the reduction of un-
certainty (i.e., the information) that is generatedwhen a
system enters a particular state through causal interac-
tions among its parts, above and beyond the informa-
tion that is generated independently within the parts
themselves (hence integrated information). The parts
should be chosen in such a way that they can account
for as much nonintegrated (independent) information
as possible.
If a system has a positive value of  (and it is not
included within a larger subset having higher ) it is
called a complex. For a complex, and only for a complex,
it is appropriate to say that when it enters a particular
state, it generates an amount of integrated information
corresponding to. Since integrated information can
only be generated within a complex and not outside
its boundaries, consciousness is necessarily subjective,
private, and related to a single point of view or per-
spective (Tononi & Edelman 1998). Some properties
of complexes are worth pointing out. A given physical
system, such as a brain, is likely to contain more than
one complex, many small ones with low values, and
perhaps a few large ones. We suspect that in the brain
there is at any given time a complex of comparatively
much higher , which we call the main complex. Also,
a complex can be causally connected to elements that
are not part of it through ports-in and ports-out. In that
case, elements that are part of the complex contribute
to its conscious experience, while elements that are not
part of it do not, even though they may be connected
to it and exchange information with it through ports-in
and ports-out. One should also note that the  value
of a complex is dependent on both spatial and tem-
poral scales that determine what counts as a state of
the underlying system. In general, the relevant spatial
and temporal scales are those that jointly maximize
 (Tononi 2004b). In the case of the brain, the spa-
tial elements and time scales that maximize  may
be local collections of neurons such as minicolumns
and periods of time comprised between tens and hun-
dreds of milliseconds, respectively, though at this stage




Measuring  and finding complexes is not easy for
realistic systems, but it can be done for simple networks
that bear some structural resemblance to different parts
of the brain (Tononi 2004b, 2005). For example, by us-
ing computer simulations, it is possible to show that
high  requires networks that conjoin functional spe-
cialization (due to its specialized connectivity, each ele-
ment has a unique functional role within the network)
with functional integration (there are many pathways
for interactions among the elements.). In very rough
terms, this kind of architecture is characteristic of the
mammalian thalamo-cortical system: different parts of
the cerebral cortex are specialized for different func-
tions, yet a vast network of connections allows these
parts to interact profusely. Indeed, the thalamo-cortical
system is precisely the part of the brain which cannot
be severely impaired without loss of consciousness.
Conversely, is low for systems that are made up of
small, quasi-independent modules. This may be why
the cerebellum, despite its large number of neurons,
does not contribute much to consciousness: its synaptic
organization is such that individual patches of cerebel-
lar cortex tend to be activated independently of one
another, with little interaction between distant patches
(Cohen & Yarom 1998; Bower 2002).
Computer simulations also show that units along
multiple, segregated incoming or outgoing pathways
are not incorporated within the repertoire of the main
complex. This may be why neural activity in afferent
pathways (perhaps as far as V1), though crucial for
triggering this or that conscious experience, does not
contribute directly to conscious experience; nor does
activity in efferent pathways (perhaps starting with pri-
mary motor cortex), though it is crucial for reporting
each different experience.
The addition of many parallel cycles also generally
does not change the composition of the main complex,
although  values can be altered. Instead, cortical
and subcortical cycles or loops implement specialized
subroutines that are capable of influencing the states
of the main thalamocortical complex without joining
it. Such informationally insulated cortico-subcortical
loops could constitute the neural substrates for many
unconscious processes that can affect and be affected
by conscious experience (Baars 1988; Tononi 2004a,
b), such as those that enable object recognition, lan-
guage parsing, or translating our vague intentions into
the right words. At this stage, however, it is hard to say
preciselywhich cortical circuitsmay be informationally
insulated. Are primary sensory cortices organized like
massive afferent pathways to a main complex “higher
up” in the cortical hierarchy? Is much of prefrontal
cortex organized like a massive efferent pathway? Do
certain cortical areas, such as those belonging to the
dorsal visual stream, remain partly segregated from
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the main complex? Do interactions within a cortico-
thalamic minicolumn qualify as intrinsic miniloops
that support themain complexwithout being part of it?
Unfortunately, answering these questions and properly
testing the predictions of the theory require a much
better understanding of cortical neuroanatomy than is
presently available (Ascoli 1999).
Other simulations show that the effects of cortical
disconnections are readily captured in terms of inte-
grated information (Tononi 2004b): a “callosal” cut
produces, out of large complex corresponding to the
connected thalamocortical system, two separate com-
plexes, in line with many studies of split-brain patients
(Gazzaniga 1995). However, because there is great re-
dundancy between the two hemispheres, their value
is not greatly reduced compared to when they formed
a single complex. Functional disconnections may also
lead to a restriction of the neural substrate of conscious-
ness, as is seen in neurological neglect phenomena, in
psychiatric conversion and dissociative disorders, and
possibly during dreaming and hypnosis. It is also likely
that certain attentional phenomenamay correspond to
changes in the composition of the main complex un-
derlying consciousness. Phenomena such as the atten-
tional blink, where a fixed sensory input may at times
make it to consciousness and at times not, may also be
due to changes in functional connectivity: access to the
main thalamocortical complex may be enabled or not
based on dynamics intrinsic to the complex (Dehaene
et al. 2003). Phenomena such as binocular rivalry may
also be related, at least in part, to dynamic changes in
the composition of the main thalamocortical complex
caused by transient changes in functional connectiv-
ity (Lumer 1998). Computer simulations confirm that
functional disconnection can reduce the size of a com-
plex and reduce its capacity to integrate information
(Tononi 2004b). While it is not easy to determine, at
present, whether a particular group of neurons is ex-
cluded from the main complex because of hard-wired
anatomical constraints, or is transiently disconnected
due to functional changes, the set of elements under-
lying consciousness is not static, but form a dynamic
complex or dynamic core (Tononi & Edelman 1998).
From the perspective of integrated information, a
reduction of consciousness during early sleep would be
consistent with the ensuing bistability of cortical cir-
cuits. As we have seen, studies using TMS in conjunc-
tion with high-density EEG show that early NREM
sleep is associated either with a breakdown of the ef-
fective connectivity among cortical areas, and thereby
with a loss of integration (Massimini et al. 2005, 2007),
or with a stereotypical global response suggestive of a
loss of repertoire and thus of information (Massimini
et al. 2007). Computer simulations also indicate that
the capacity to integrate information is reduced if neu-
ral activity is extremely high and near synchronous,
due to a dramatic decrease in the available degrees of
freedom (Balduzzi and Tononi, in preparation). This
reduction in degrees of freedom could be the reason
why consciousness is reduced or eliminated in absence
seizure and other conditions characterized by hyper-
synchronous neural activity.
Finally, we have seen that consciousness not only re-
quires a neural substrate with appropriate anatomical
structure and appropriate physiological parameters, it
also needs time (Bachmann 2000). The theory pre-
dicts that the time requirement for the generation of
conscious experience in the brain emerge directly from
the time requirements for the build-up of an integrated
repertoire among the elements of the thalamocortical
main complex (Balduzzi and Tononi II, in prepara-
tion). To give an obvious example, if one were to per-
turb half of the elements of the main complex for less
than a millisecond, no perturbations would produce
any effect on the other half within this time window,
and the repertoire measured by  would be equal to
zero. After say 100 ms, however, there is enough time
for differential effects to be manifested, and  should
grow.
Some Implications
The examples discussed above show that the inte-
grated information theory can begin to account, in a
coherent manner, for several puzzling facts about con-
sciousness and the brain. This goes beyond proposing
a provisional list of candidate brain areas for the NCC
and of seemingly important neural ingredients, such as
synchronization, sustained or phasic firing, reentrant
activity, or widespread “broadcasting,” without a prin-
cipled explanation of why they would be important
or whether they would be always necessary. Naturally,
the integrated information theory converges with other
neurobiological frameworks (e.g., Crick & Koch 2003;
Edelman 1989; Dehaene et al. 2006) and cognitive
theories (Baars 1988) on certain key facts: that our
own consciousness is generated by distributed thalam-
ocortical networks, that reentrant interactions among
multiple cortical regions are important, that the mech-
anisms of consciousness and attention overlap but are
not the same, and that there are many “unconscious”
neural systems.
The integrated information theory avoids the pit-
falls associated with assigning conscious qualities to
individual brain elements. For example, it is some-
times assumed loosely that the firing of specific thala-
mocortical elements (e.g., those for red) conveys some
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specific information (e.g., that there is something red)
and that such information becomes conscious either as
such, or perhaps if it is disseminated widely. However,
a given thalamocortical element has no information
about whether what made it fire was a particular color
rather than a shape, a visual stimulus rather than a
sound, a sensory stimulus rather than a thought. All
it knows is whether it fired or not, just as each receiv-
ing element only knows whether it received an input
or not. Thus, the information specifying “red” cannot
possibly be in themessage conveyed by the firing of any
neural element, whether it is located in a high-order
cortical area or whether it is broadcasting widely. Ac-
cording to the theory, that information resides instead
in the reduction of uncertainty occurring when awhole
complex enters one out of a large number of available
states—the complex, and not its elements, is the lo-
cus of consciousness. Indeed, within a complex, both
active and inactive neurons count, just as the sound
of an orchestra is specified both by the instruments
that are playing and by those that are silent. Though
it would be too long to address the issue here, the
theory proposes that, just as the quantity of conscious-
ness is given by the amount of integrated information
generated within a complex, the particular quality of
consciousness—including the redness of red—is given
by the specific informational relationships among the
elements of the complex (Tononi 2004b).
The integrated information theory also predicts that
consciousness depends exclusively on the ability of a
system to integrate information, whether or not it has a
strong sense of self, language, emotion, or is immersed
in an environment, contrary to some common intu-
itions. Nevertheless, the theory recognizes that these
same factors are important historically because they fa-
vor the development of neural circuits forming a main
complex of high . For example, integrated informa-
tion grows as that system incorporates statistical regu-
larities from its environment and learns (Tononi et al.
1996). In this sense, the emergence of consciousness in
biological systems is predicated on a long evolutionary
history, on individual development, and on experience-
dependent change in neural connectivity.
Finally, the integrated information theory says that
the presence and extent of consciousness can be deter-
mined, in principle, also in cases in which we have no
verbal report, such as in infants or animals, or in neu-
rological conditions such asminimally conscious states,
akinetic mutism, psychomotor seizures, and sleepwalk-
ing. In practice, of course, measuring  accurately in
such systems will not be easy, but approximations and
informed guesses are certainly conceivable. The the-
ory also implies that consciousness is not an all-or-none
property but is graded: specifically, it increases in pro-
portion to a system’s repertoire of available states. In
fact, any physical system with some capacity for inte-
grated information would have some degree of expe-
rience, irrespective of the stuff of which it is made, and
independent of its ability to report.
At present, the validity of this theoretical frame-
work and the plausibility of its implications rest on
its ability to account, in a coherent manner, for some
basic phenomenological observations and for some el-
ementary but puzzling facts about consciousness and
the brain. Experimental developments, such as ways
to concurrently stimulate and record the activity of
broad regions of the brain, should permit stringent
tests of some of the theory’s predictions. Especially im-
portant will be paradigms to test the counterintuitive
prediction that experience can change even though the
underlying neural activity stays the same: if one inacti-
vates neurons that are silent, the current firing pattern
would not change, but the repertoire of available neu-
ral states would shrink and consciousness should be
diminished.
Conclusions
As this chapter demonstrates, the study of conscious-
ness has entered an intense experimental phase, a re-
freshing change from the previous millennia when the
only approach available to students of the mind was
philosophical speculation. The two dominant exper-
imental paradigms are the study of brain differences
between the awake, conscious state and various degrees
of unconsciousness, such as deep sleep, anesthesia, or
coma, and the study of the brain basis of the changing
content of consciousness, as in when one visual stimu-
lus is consciously perceived but then becomes invisible
and vice versa.
In order to make progress, it will be imperative to
record from a large number of neurons simultaneously
at many locations throughout the cortico-thalamic sys-
tem and related satellites in behaving subjects. Such
experiments cannot, of course, be done in humans.
Progress in understanding the circuitry of conscious-
ness therefore demands a battery of behaviors (akin to
but different from the well-known Turing test for intel-
ligence) that the subject—a newborn infant, immobi-
lized patient, or nonhuman animal—has to pass before
considering him, her, or it to possess some measure of
conscious experience. This is not an insurmountable
step for mammals such as the monkey or the mouse
that share many behaviors and brain structures with
humans. For example, one particular mouse model of
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contingency awareness (Han et al. 2003) is based on
the differential requirement for awareness of trace ver-
sus delay associative eyeblink conditioning in humans
(Clark & Squire).
The growing ability of neuroscientists to manipulate
in a reversible, transient, deliberate, and delicate man-
ner identified populations of neurons using methods
from molecular biology combined with optical stim-
ulation (Aravanis et al. 2007; Han & Boyden 2007;
Zhang et al. 2007) enables the intrepid neuroengineer
to move from correlation—observing that a particular
conscious state is associated with some neural or hemo-
dynamic activity—to causation. For example, rather
than just noting that motion perception is associated
with an elevated firing rate in projection neurons in cor-
tical area MT, we will be able to perturb the system by
inactivating genetically distinct subpopulations of cells
in a highly targeted manner. Exploiting these increas-
ingly powerful tools depends on the simultaneous de-
velopment of appropriate behavioral assays and model
organisms amenable to large-scale genomic analysis
and manipulation, in particularly in mice (Lein et al.
2007) and rats.
Finally, as we have argued here, it is imperative
to complement experimental studies with the devel-
opment of full-blown theories that try to capture the
essential properties of consciousness; suggest ways to
measure them; can be validated through counterin-
tuitive experimental tests; permit the extrapolation to
pathological conditions, animals, and even artifacts;
and begin to offer a framework to understand how and
why the different modalities of consciousness map onto
different brain architectures and processes. Only the
combination of fine-grained neuronal analysis in mice,
rats, and monkeys; ever more sensitive psychophysical
and brain imaging techniques in patients and healthy
individuals; and the development of a robust theo-
retical framework can lend hope to the belief that hu-
man ingenuity can, ultimately, understand in a rational
manner one of the central mysteries of life.
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